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Johnson and Edwards: Breathalizers: Should the State Be Required to Preserve the Ampou

BREATHALYZERS: SHOULD THE STATE BE
REQUIRED TO PRESERVE THE AMPOULES?
Beverage alcohol is fecal matter. Alcohol is not
made of grapes or grain or other attractive foods.
It is these which are devoured by the ferment germ,
and the germ then evacuates alcohol as its waste
product. The thought of swallowing the excrement
of a living organism is not an aesthetic idea but
people will do such things.'
Whatever one's personal preferences about alcohol may
be, its use has become a part of American society. In response to the problems created by intoxicated drivers, all
fifty states have adopted statutes governing the conduct of
the drinking, driving public. 2 The central feature in all of
these statutes is the legal fiction of "implied consent" to a
chemical test for intoxication. This feature has become a
"well accepted part of American Law."'
One of the chemical tests for intoxication that has
achieved wide acceptance is the breathalyzer. In 1974, the
California Supreme Court shocked users of the breathalyzer
by holding that the state was required to preserve the
ampoules used in the test to allow defendants the opportunity
to conduct an independent analysis.4 Since that decision,
several states have made their own contribution to the question of preservation of both the breath and the ampoule.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze existing case
law on that question. A selected bibliography is included
at the end of this article.
BREATHALYZER OPERATION

An understanding of the question of preservation of the
ampoules necessarily rests on an understanding of the workings of the breathalyzer. In 1960, the Washington case of
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming
1. SMITH AND HELWIE, LIQUoR:THE SERVANT OF MAN 25 (1940).

Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 49-50 n. 1 (1978).
3. Id.
4. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal.2d 641, 527 P.2d 361 (1974).
2.
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State v. Baker set forth a concise description of the operation of the machine:
The breathalyzer is a machine designed to
measure the amount of alcohol in the alveolar
breath and is based upon the principle that the
ratio between the amount of alcohol in the blood
and the amount in the alveolar breath from the
lungs is a constant 2100 to 1' In other words, the
machine analyzes a sample of breath to determine
the alcoholic content of the blood....
To operate the machine, the subject blows into
the machine through a mouthpiece until he has
emptied his lungs in one breath. The machine is so
designed that it traps only the last 52'2 cubic
centimeters of air that has been blown into it. This
air is then forced, by weight of a piston, through
a test ampoule containing a solution of sulphuric
acid and potassium dichromate. This test solution
has a yellow hue to it. As the breath sample
bubbles through the test solution, the sulphuric
acid extracts the alcohol, if any, therefrom, and
the potassium dichromate then changes the alcohol
to acetic acid, thereby causing the solution to lose
some of its original yellow color. The greater the
alcoholic content of the breath sample, the greater
will be the loss in color of the test solution. By
causing a light to pass through the test ampoule and
through a standard ampoule containing the same
chemical solution as the test ampoule (but through
which no breath sample has passed), the amount of
the change in color can be measured by photoelectric
cells which are connected to a galvanometer, a reading can be obtained from a gauge which has been
calibrated in terms of the percentage of alcohol in
the blood.
OVERVIEW OF PROSECUTION'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE

The question raised by defense counsel in drunk driving
cases is whether important evidence has been suppressed by
5. 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (1960).
6. But see, Comment, Breath Alcohol Analysis: Can It Withstand Modern
Scientific Scrutiny, 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 207-218 (1978) which questions the
invariability of this ratio.
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the usual police practice of destroying the test ampoule. The
seminal cases in the area of the state's duty to disclose
evidence are Brady v. Maryland' and United States v.
Agurs.s Both cases provide that the touchstone as to whether
the state should disclose certain evidence is whether the
defendant was afforded a fair trial, a substantive due process formulation. To that end, Brady held that 'the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 9 Examination
of this holding discloses that to establish a violation of the
Brady rule, an accused must show: (1) evidence which is
favorable to him; (2) such evidence was in the possession
of the prosecution at some time; (3) the evidence was suppressed and not made available to the accused on his request
therefor; and (4) the evidence was material either to the
issue of the accused's guilt or punishment."
In general, elements two and three of this reformulation of Brady are easily met by an accused. The police conduct many of the breathalyzer tests, and the prosecution is
responsible for information known by the police and other
investigators directly connected with the prosecutor's office."
As for element three, "suppress" is defined as "to put a
stop to a thing actually existing."1 " Thus, according to this
definition, the ampoule, by its destruction, has been suppressed. Evolving case law since Brady indicates that
"[s]uppression has consistently been used synonymously
with nondisclosure."' 3 Since the Brady holding applies
"irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,"'"

it seems clear that even where the prosecution

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1962).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Brady v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 87.
Edwards v. Oklahoma, 429 F. Supp. 668, 671 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
-11. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIIINAL PROCEDURE 281 (1978). Note that
the prosecution may not be responsible for information known by law
enforcement agencies of another governmental entity. Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.

12.

13.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1291
WHITEBREAD, supra note 11, at

(5th ed. 1979).

281, citing Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470,

at 474 (8th Cir. 1973).
14. Brady v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 87. Note also
note 11, at 282 n. 26.
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destroys the ampoule in good faith, it has been "suppressed."
The other elements of Brady, however, are not so easily met
by an accused.
The Requirement That The Evidence Be Favorable To The
Accused
The result of the breathalyzer test is not conclusive of
the guilt of the accused, but only raises a rebuttable presumption of intoxication. Assuming that the ampoule was
saved and given to the defense, the only use that could be
made of it would be to impeach the credibility of the
breathalyzer, or possibly the operator. The question then
arises as to whether impeaching evidence is "favorable"
evidence. The South Dakota Supreme Court answered the
question in the negative in the 1979 case of State v. Helmer,1"
when it construed the "favorable" requirement to mean that
the evidence must be exculpatory. It then defined "exculpatory" as "evidence which tends to negate the guilt or
support the innocence of the accused," as distinguished from
"evidence which is merely collateral or impeaching."1 Given
this construction of "favorable," an accused could never
meet this requirement. While Helmer did not make this
distinction, perhaps the better rule would be to allow impeaching evidence of this type to meet the requirement
where the only evidence against an accused is the result of
the breathalyzer test.
The Requirement Of Materiality
The United States Supreme Court explained its understanding of materiality in United States v. Agurs.Y The
Court stated that "[t]he mere possibility that an item of
undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or
might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense."" Thus, the
accused must do more than indulge in idle speculation as to
the benefits to be gained by attempting to retest the ampoule.
15.
16.
17.
18.

,278
N.W.2d 808 (1979).
State v. Helmer, ___ S.D.
Id. at 811-812.
United States v. Agurs, supra note 8, at 109-110.
Id.
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Furthermore, constitutional error is not committed when
evidence is excluded unless it would have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.19 In Edwards v.
State of Oklahoma 0 the court held that, under Agurs, impeaching evidence would not rise to the level of creating a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist where there
was other evidence of the defendant's guilt. Therefore, it
would seem that to establish materiality, the defendant
must show some probable benefit to be gained by obtaining
the evidence, and that it would create a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist. Following Edwards, that burden could not be met where there was evidence of defendant's guilt other than the results of the breathalyzer.
Several courts have held that where the implied consent statute provides a presumption of intoxication upon
a certain blood alcohol percentage, the ampoule is obviously
material.2 ' Without the ampoule, there is no way to rebut
the presumption of intoxication, therefore the defendant is
denied due process of law. The error in applying this analysis
indiscriminately is that the state may have a provision in its
implied consent law which allows the defendant to have an
independent blood test or urine test which may be used to
challenge the results of the breathalyzer. Wyoming's provision is found in Section 31-6-105(d) of the Wyoming
Statutes.2 Cases in states with provisions similar to Wyoming's have considered the question and held that due process
only requires that the defendant have some method of impeaching the results. If the defendant has the right to take
an independent test which can be used to impeach the results
of the breathalyzer, due process is satisfied; whether the
defendant actually avails himself of this provision is immaterial.
The most persuasive argument that the ampoule could
Dot be material is that any retest of the ampoule would not
19. Id.
20. Edwards v. Oklahoma, eupra note 10, at 671.
21. See e.g., Garcia v. Dist. Ct.,.... Colo. ___ 589 P.2d 924 (1979); Scales
v. City Ct. of City of Mesa ......... Ariz. ___ 594 P.2d 97 (1979).
22. WYO. STAT. § 31-6-105(d) (1977).
23. See e.g., State v. Helmer, supra note 15; State v. Canaday, 90 Wash.2d
808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978).
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be admissible in court. The general standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence is what is known as the
Frye standard, originally set out in Frye v. United States. 4
The test is "whether the scientific principle from which
deductions are made is sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the scientific community." 5
The rationale of the Frye standard is that
expert testimony may be permitted to reach a trier
of fact only when the reliability of the underlying
scientific principles has been accepted by the scienIn other words, scientists in
tific community ....
the field must make the initial determination
whether an experimental principle is reliable and
accurate."0
Wyoming implicitly accepted the Frye standard in Cullin v.
State."
Therefore, if the ampoule were given to the defendant
for retesting by his expert, the method of retesting must
have gained the general acceptance of the scientific community to be admissible in court. But there is no generally
accepted test with regard to retesting breathalyzer ampoules.
In 1975, the Committee on Alcohol and Drugs of the National
Safety Council, which is composed of the leading toxicologists and other scientists in the field of chemical tests for
alcohol influence, unanimously adopted the following resolution, which is still in effect:
Some issues have been raisedin the California
Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Hitch. and
allied cases in which the court held that chemicals
and ampoules used in breath test cases must be
preserved for possible pre-trial examination and
analysis by defendants should they so demand it.
A review of the scientific- merits of this position has been made. It is concluded -that, at the
present time, a scientifically valid procedure is not24. Frye v. United States, 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
25. State v. Canaday, supra note 23, at 1188.
26. Id. Note, however, that some courts apply a relevancy standard as opposed
to the Frye standard. See, Berger, Courts Wrestle with Standards for
Admission of Scientific Advances, Nat. L. J. Sept. 24, 1979, at 22-23.
27. Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 457-458 (Wyo. 197.).
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known to be available for the reexamination of a
breathalyzer ampoule, that has been used in the
breath test for ethanol, in order to confirm the
accuracy and reliability of the original breath
analysis.28
Thus, because of the inadmissibility of retest results, there
could not possibly be any material information gained
through retesting the ampoule. While most courts have
failed to consider this issue, those that have have held that
the evidence was not material for this reason. 9
Because the evidence would not be favorable to the
accused or material to his defense, Brady does not require
that the state preserve the ampoule for retesting by the
defendant.
PEOPLE V. HITCH
The defendant, Warner Hitch, was arrested for driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Under California's
implied consent law, he chose to have a test of his breath,
and the officer administered a breathalyzer test at the jail.
The officer followed the standard procedures, and the machine indicated a blood alcohol reading of .20%. After the
test, the officer poured the contents of the test ampoule into
a glass bottle and discarded the ampoule itself. The bottle
was then delivered to the Ventura County crime laboratory
which, according to its established policy, eventually disposed
of the contents."0
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the
results of the breathalyzer test on the ground that the
destruction of the test ampoule and its contents deprived
him of due process of law. After a hearing, the court granted
defendant's motion to suppress and dismissed the action.
The state appealed the dismissal; it was eventually reversed
and remanded to the municipal court for trial. The California
Published and republished in JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCE, July 7, 1978,
at page 432. A telephone call to the Committee on Sept. 20, 1979 confirmed
that the resolution is still current.
29. See e.g. State v. Canaday, supra note 23, State v. Teare, 135 N.J. Super,
19, 342 A.2d 556 (1975).
30. People v. Hitch, supra note 4, at 363.
28.
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Supreme Court then granted a hearing.31 That court subsequently held that where
such evidence cannot be disclosed because of its
intentional but nonmalicious destruction by the
investigative officials, sanctions shall in the future
be imposed for such nonpreservation and nondisclosure unless the prosecution can show that the
governmental agencies involved have established,
enforced and attempted in good faith to adhere to
rigorous and systematic procedures designed to
preserve the test ampoule and its contents and the
reference ampoule used in such chemical test. The
prosecution shall bear the burden of demonstrating
that such duty to preserve the ampoules and their
contents has been fulfilled. If the prosecution meets
its burden and makes the required showing, then
the results of the breathalyzer test shall be admissible in evidence, even though the ampoules
and their contents have been lost."
Ironically, Mr. Hitch was denied relief because the court
made the holding prospective only."
As the first major case to hold that the state is required to save the ampoules, Hitch became the cornerstone
of motions to suppress based on the destruction of the
ampoules. The case, however, is analytically defective.
The California Supreme Court blithely assumed that
retesting was possible, based on the findings of the court
below. There was no consideration as to the admissibility
of any evidence gained from retesting." As pointed out
above, retesting procedures do not meet the Frye standard,
and should therefore be inadmissible as evidence. This flaw
renders the entire decision questionable.
The Hitch court also assumed that the ampoules were
material because of the statutory presumption which arose
when a person had a blood alcohol content of .10% or
greater. The court itself pointed out that the defendant
could have had an independent test, but failed to consider
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

364 n. 2.
369.
370.
364 n. 1.
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what effect that might have on any due process problems."
Since the purpose of maintaining the ampoules and retesting
them is to impeach the results of the breathalyzer, an independent examination could provide the same opportunity
for impeachment. In fact, that opportunity would be greater,
in light of the failure of retests to be admissible in court.
Therefore, as discussed above, due process is satisfied by the
opportunity to have an independent test.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against Hitch
is that it misapplies the Brady rule.
The Hitch court found that it sufficed that there
was a "reasonable possibility" that they [the ampoules] might constitute favorable evidence. This
extension of the Brady Doctrine is not justified as
a matter of constitutional law. Brady focused upon
the harm to the defendant resulting from nondisclosure. Hitch diverts this concern from the
reality of prejudice to speculation about contingent
benefits to the defendant. Without regard to the
culpability of the prosecution or the specific prejudice to the accused the rule would render constitutionally infirm every conviction in which there
are missing items of evidence or evidence which
may have been destroyed or damaged by careless
or inept investigators. Historically, these have been
matters to be argued to the jury as perhaps raising
a reasonable doubt as to the strength of the prosecution's case. 6
Interestingly enough, the predictions about every conviction
where there is missing evidence becoming constitutionally
infirm have not come to pass. This is largely because the
California courts have been retreating from the literal
language of Hitch.
In a 1976 case, People v. Vera,"7 the court rejected
defendant's claim that the police should have preserved or
photographed his latent fingerprints in place as a prerequisite to admission of fingerprint testimony. The defendant argued that this evidence could possibly have helped
35. Id. at 370 n. 7.
36. Edwards v. Oklahoma, supra note 10, at 671.
37. People v. Vera, 62 Cal.3d 293, 132 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976).
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him to impeach the testimony of the police fingerprint
expert.3 8 The court found that: (1) there were ways to
frame a defendant through the use of fingerprints," but
this defendant had not provided any evidence that it could
be done." Additionally, the court stated it was uncertain
that authorities unanimously agreed that a defendant could
be so framed. 4 This sounds suspiciously like an argument
based on Frye and Brady. (2) There was no testimony as
to the problems that would be faced by law enforcement
agencies if latent prints had to be preserved in place. 2
The Hitch court was unconcerned about such problems.
(3) There was no evidence to support a charge of fabrication
and the testimony was corroborated by other evidence.4
In another 1976 case, People v. James," the court found
that receipts destroyed by the prosecution would have
seriously damaged the trial testimony of a co-defendant,
but would have functioned primarily as impeachment. Since
impeaching evidence would not have exculpated the defendant, he was not deprived of a fair trial by the destruction
of the receipts. The court thus defined "exculpated" as
establishing the innocence of the defendant," and in doing
so distinguished Hitch.
These cases illustrate that the California courts are
reluctant to apply Hitch in many contexts and actually are
retreating to a standard that more closely approximates the
Brady Doctrine. In Vera, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the evidence was either favorable or material;
in James, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the
evidence was favorable (exculpatory)."' Thus, the Hitch
formulation ("reasonable possibility" that the evidence
would be favorable) seems to be losing vitality.
38.
39.
.40.
41.
.42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
id.
People v. James, 56 Cal.3d 876, 128 Cal-Rptr. 733, 743 (1976).
Id.
See e.g. State v. Helmer, supra note 15.
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Another interesting aspect of Hitch is that it has had
little effect upon drunk driving prosecutions in California.4
In People v. Miller,4 the defendant was convicted of driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, the
court was called on to decide whether Hitch should be extended to the results of all chemical tests of breath conducted by use of the "Omicron Intoxilyzer."" The court
described the working of the Intoxilyzer this way:
The subject's breath is captured in a metal chamber, infra-red energy of fixed intensity and wave
length is passed through the chamber from one side
to a photo-electric cell on the other side. Alcohol
absorbs light of the fixed wave length. The device
computes the loss of energy, translates the result
in terms of the grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters
of blood, and prints the result upon a card. In the
prescribed operation of the device, clear air is first
tested, then the breath of the subject. The chamber
is then purged by blowing clear air through it, the
clear air is tested, and all three results appear upon
the printout card. The two tests of clear air constitute a test of the machine, and should show zero
alcohol content. It is apparent that no test result,
save the printout card, was available for preservation."
The defendant claimed that had a breathalyzer been used,
he could have had a sample for retesting; by using the
Intoxilyzer, he was deprived of any possibility of retesting.
The court rejected the argument that all evidence which
can be reduced to preservable form by any means must be
so transformed and then retained.' The court then placed
its imprimatur on the Intoxilyzer."
The effect of Hitch in California is as ironic as was
the denial of the benefit of the decision to its namesake.
In 1974, California was in the process of replacing the
47. Johnson, The Supreme Court of California 1975-1976 Forward: The Accidental Decision and How It Happens, 65 CAL. L. REV. 231-254 (March
1977).
48. People v. Miller, 52 Cal.3d 666, 125 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1975).
49. Id. at 342.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 343.
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breathalyzer with the supposedly superior "Omicron Intoxilyzer."53 Therefore, defendants are still being tested
by a machine, the statutory presumption regarding intoxication still applies, but there is no sample for retesting.
PRESERVATION

OF BREATH

A variation on the theme of preservation of the ampoules is preservation of the breath itself. As has been previously noted, in 1975 the California Supreme Court, in
People v. Miller, found preservation of the breath outside
the purview of the Hitch doctrine. 4 A year later the New
Hampshire Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
State v. Shutt.5 That court found that the New Hampshire
implied consent statute made no provision for the preservation of breath because that bodily substance is not capable
of being retained." In formulating its decision, the court
referred specifically to the statute, finding no express or
implied mandate to preserve the ampoules." It stated that
preservation of the ampoules would be analogous to the
preservation of chemicals used in testing blood or urine,
and noted that the statute also did not require preservation
of such chemicals." The New Hampshire statute in question
provided detailed and exact safeguards in the breathalyzer
testing procedure. Additionally, it provided the "due process
of his
safeguard of permitting defendant an additional test
59
choosing."
own
his
of
person
a
by
own performed
Two 1979 cases discussing discovery requirements
reached opposite conclusions on the question of preservation of the breath; the Oregon Court of Appeals, in State v.
Simpson,60 held that breath is not discoverable, and the
Colorado Supreme Court, in Garcia v. Dist. Ct., 1 held that
the state has a duty to preserve such samples.
53. Johnson, supra note 47.
54. People v. Miller, supra note 48.
55. State v. Shutt, 116 N.H. 495, 363 A.2d 406 (1976).
56. Id. at 407.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 407-408.
594 P.2d 425 (1979).
60. State v. Simpson, ____ Or. App.
589 P.2d 924 (1979).
Colo....
61. Garcia v. Dist. Ct. __
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The applicable section of Oregon's discovery statute, 2
speaks of the disclosure of reports, statements or results
of examinations intended to be offered into evidence at trial.
Subsection (4) of that statute specifically refers to books,
papers and tangible objects.6 Defendant argued that his
breath was a tangible object "because it could be perceived
by at least one of the senses and could chemically react." 4
He sought to obtain the sample for retesting. The court
concluded that the legislature, in formulating the statute,
had not intended the term "tangible objects," as used therein,
to include a breath sample. 5
Analyzing defendant's contentions in terms of the
statute, the court found that the ampoule was not a "result,"
but was part of the test mechanism."0 The "result" was the
blood alcohol reading, which is commonly offered into evidence. Taking the sample further from the statute was the
fact that the district attorney did not intend to offer the
ampoule into evidence.
The Colorado Supreme Court, reaching the opposite
conclusion, found a violation of due process in the denial
of discovery. Its reasoning was based, not on an analysis
of the discovery statute, as in Simpson, but on its view of
fundamental fairness and materiality.
The state, of course, has no obligation to give defendant any blood alcohol test. (citations omitted.)
However, fundamental fairness requires that, when
the state does offer such tests, its decision to preserve a separate sample of evidence for independent testing in one case, but not in another, must
bear a rational relation to some legitimate state
interest.6" (citations omitted.)
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

OR. REV. STAT. § 135.815 is similar in terms to Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 18.
State v. Simpson, supra note 60, at 425.
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Garcia v. Dist. Ct., supra note 61, at 929 n. 3. A telephone call to the Denver
District Attorney's Office, Sept. 28, 1979, elicited the assurance that
Colorado is in compliance with the requirements of Garcia that a sample
of the breath be preserved for the accused. Three districts, including
Denver, have purchased new systems, Intoximeters, manufactured in
Mintern, Colorado. These machines each cost $4,000.00, and the samples
cost about $.60 apiece. Other districts have retained their Gas Chromatograph systems and are using the Mobat system to preserve a separate
breath sample for the accused.
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The court held that where the defendant submits to a
breath test to determine his blood alcohol content, and the
state intends to use that test as evidence, the state must
furnish defendant with a separate sample of his breath
"in a manner which will permit scientifically reliable independent testing.""
Note that Colorado, unlike New Hampshire or Wyoming, does not provide the accused with the opportunity to
obtain an independent test of intoxication. It does, however, provide that separate samples of an accused's blood
or urine, taken for the intoxication test, be preserved in
order that the defendant may test them for impeachment
purposes. The holding of Garcia is a logical extension of the
statute to samples of breath. The limitation of the statute
makes more obvious the court's opinion that failure to
collect and preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, when
such could be done as a "mere incident to a procedure
routinely performed" is "tantamount to suppression of that
evidence. ' ' "e Colorado's statute, when supplemented by Justice Erickson's due process analysis, becomes more closely
aligned with implied consent statutes offering an independent test to an accused.
LAUDERDALE

V. STATE

In 1976, an Alaska resident sought review of the denial
of the opportunity to test the reliability or credibility of
the results of a breathalyzer test. He appealed from the
Superior Court's reversal of the trial court's order to suppress results of a breathalyzer test. The Superior Court
found that "the expert testimony did not meet the test of
establishing that preservation and subsequent analysis of
the ampoules would provide scientifically reliable data that
would materially assist the petitioner's case. '"
The Alaska Supreme Court held "that there was plausible evidence that could be derived from later testing of the
test ampoule which could bear upon the propriety of the
68. Garcia v. Dist. Ct., supra note 61, at 930.

69. Id. at 929-930.

70. Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 379 (Alaska 1976).
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examination of the ampoule in the breathalyzer machine.
S. .,,I' In so holding, that court sought to get around the
"favorable evidence" requirement of Brady by analogizing
the denial of an opportunity to retest the ampoule with
the denial of cross-examination, thus making the former a
denial of due process, an error of constitutional dimensions.
A denial of the right to make such analysis, that
is to say, to "cross-examine" the results of the test,
would be reversible error without any need for a
showing of prejudice. It would be a denial of a
right to a fair trial, and a fair trial is essential to
affording an accused due process of law.72
While Brady, and Alaska Criminal Rule 16(b) (7),
require that the evidence sought to be discovered by the
defendant be shown to be material, the Lauderdale court
found, under its cross-examination analogy, that reasonable
latitude should be afforded the petitioner. Just as a crossexaminer could not know in advance what pertinent facts
might be brought out by his cross-examination, so the
petitioner need not state to the court what facts his analysis
might develop. "Cross-examination ... is a matter of right,
and the purpose of that right is to attempt to bring out
facts which will tend to discredit the witness by showing
that his testimony was untrue."7
The court reasoned that the materiality requirement
as to the ampoule was satisfied by the fact that a rebuttable
presumption of intoxication was raised by the statute. 4 It
stated that the favorableness of the evidence obtained from
the ampoule would not be known until after the ampoule
had been subjected to a "cross-examination" of study and
analysis." It further found that no accurate means of rerunning the test existed, but that a test on the used ampoule
could be made, and if different results were obtained, "the
original results would be suspect. The reason for this is that
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 379.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 380; Accord, Scales v. City Ct. of City of Mesa, - -----Ariz -.. , 594
P.2d 97 (1979); People v. Johnson, 74 Cal.2d 205, 141 Cal. Rptr. 418, 422
(1977).
75. Lauderdale v. State, supra note 70, at 381.
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the passage of time, with the chemical changes in the solution in the ampoule, would normally cause the test results
to show an increase in blood alcohol."" The finding that it
is not possible to "rerun a test and obtain accurate results"
is inconsistent with the impeachment value the court placed
on the "test of a used ampoule." One is as much a retest
of the ampoule as the other.
The court's analysis is circular and somewhat difficult
to reconcile. It would seem to follow from its finding that
no reliable method of rerunning the test exists, that evidence
obtained from any retest would be unreliable. Unreliable
evidence is inadmissible because of its unreliability, irrelevancy and immateriality.
Admittedly, on cross-examination, counsel is allowed
wide lattitude in his "questioning." The evidence he seeks
to have admitted in that cross-examination is, however,
limited by the same rule of relevancy as is the evidence
sought to be admitted on direct examination.77 Unreliable
evidence would not be relevant in that it would not logically
tend to influence the issue, that being the guilt or innocence
of the accused." If the presumption raised by the statute
is in controversy, unreliable evidence would not rationally
rebut that presumption. Unreliable evidence would not meet
the Agurs' standard of materiality, as it would not have a
legitimate bearing on the case. "It necessarily follows that
if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed."79 While results of a retest, admittedly inaccurate,
might create a doubt in the mind of the trier of fact which
did not otherwise exist, that doubt could not be reasonable
in view of the unreliability of those results.
The analogy of retest to cross-examination is unwieldy.
The rules of evidence speak in terms of cross-examination
of a person, not an inanimate object. The Lauderdale court
further muddies the water by distinguishing this situation
76. Id. at 379-380.
77. MCCORMiCK, EVIDENCE §§ 184-185 (2d. ed. 1977).
78. Id.
79. United States v. Agurs, supra note 8, at 112.
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from an earlier one in which the evidence in question, a
quantity of what appeared to be a narcotic drug, was used
up by the prosecution in its analysis."0 It would seem, from
the court's discussion, that if the breath were sampled in
such a manner that it was entirely consumed in the analysis,
the defendant would have no right to suppress the results
because there would be nothing left for him to "retest."
This is confusing because it seems to be a more direct
example of a denial of cross-examination. Logically, the
Lauderdale court should have reasoned that when a sample
is entirely destroyed by the testing procedures, it is analogous
to bad faith refusal by the prosecution to produce a witness,
while at the same time seeking to use that witness' statement against the defendant.
It would seem that the course is clear in Alaska, as it
was in California: a switch to the use of Intoxilyzers. Such
a change, however, involves some expense. Alaska law enforcement agencies have instead chosen to keep their Breathalyzers, and comply with the Lauderdale holding by keeping
the ampoules in any makeshift manner they can devise."
In one and one-half years, Deputy District Attorney Edward
F. Peterson of Anchorage, Alaska, has yet to see an ampoule
retested.2
EVIDENCE TO BE GAINED FROM RETESTING
THE AMPOULES

While courts generally recognize that there is currently
no acceptable method of retesting the ampoule, they sometimes require its preservation for physical examination. 3
Perhaps the most comprehensive laundry list of items determinable from such a physical examination is found in
Scales v. City Court of City of Mesa."4 That court found
80. Lauderdale v. State, supra note 70, at 382.
81. A telephone call to the Anchorage office of the Alaska State Troopers,
Sept. 25, 1979, found that office preserving the ampoules by taping the
test ampoule to the reference ampoule, marking it for reference, and
placing it in a board with holes drilled in it. The boards are then placed
in a locked cabinet, but are not treated as evidence. The ampoules are
periodically purged, after the date of appeal has passed.
82. Telephone conversation, Sept. 25, 1979, with Sgt. Hedle of the Alaska
State Troopers, Anchorage. Alaska.
83. See e.g., Lauderdale v. State, supra note 70.
594 P.2d 97 (1979).
Ariz __.,
84. Scales v. City Court of City of Mesa, ...
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measurements could be made of the volume of solution, the
sulphuric acid and nitric acid content, and the thickness of
the glass wall of the ampoule. Additionally, any imperfections in the glass and the existence of any foreign substance either inside or outside the ampoule could be detected."9
Many of these items in the Scales list are either superfluous or non-prejudicial to the defendant. The only feature
critical to the Breathalyzer is the volume of solution in the
ampoule,8" which must be 3 ml. with a tolerance of plus
or minus 0.1 mil. given by the manufacturer. A special
gauge for measuring this volume accompanies the breathalyzer. One of the first steps on the checklist of the breathalyzer operator is to insert the ampoules into this gauge to
measure the height, and thereby the volume, of the solution.8"
If the solution passes the gauge test, the ampoule is satisfactory. The breathalyzer result is inversely proportional
to the amount of the solution; too little solution results in
overestimation of the exact blood alcohol content, and vice
versa.
Another function of the gauge is to test the diameter
of the ampoules, which is controlled by the manufacturer
to a tolerance of between 0.625 and 0.650 inch. 8 If there is
too much play between the ampoule and the gauge, it is
readily apparent, and, because of the bore of the gauge, it
is impossible to fit an ampoule that is too large into the
gauge."
The strength of the solution is unimportant." A stronger
solution of potassium dichromate might reduce the sensitivity of the instrument, while a weaker than normal solution will give accurate answers unless it is too weak to
utilize all the alcohol in the breath sample.9 This weak
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 99-100.

90.

STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, APPROVED PROCEDURE FOR DIRECT BREATH TESTING ON THE BREATHALYZER 24,

91.

SMITH & WESSON, BREATHALYZER MAINTENANCE

COURSE 2

(1975).

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Retroactive and effective July 1, 1971 (Oct. 22, 1973).
SMITH & WESSON, supra note 86, at 2.
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condition can be detected by a total lack of yellow color in
the solution following the test. 2 Varying the sulphuric acid
content beyond the stated limits only interferes with alcohol
collection. Reduction in the sensitivity of the breathalyzer
or failure to utilize all of the alcohol in the breath would
cause an underestimation of the blood alcohol content,
hardly a prejudicial result. 3
Prior to beginning the test, two ampoules are placed
in the breathalyzer and balanced photometrically. When
this balance is achieved, each of the two photocells is receiving the same amount of light through the ampoules, and
variations in line voltage affect each ampoule and photocell equally. The effect of any imperfections in the glass of
the ampoules is negated by the balance. After accused's
breath has been introduced into the test ampoule, the breathalyzer then measures any difference in light transmittal
between the test ampoule and the reference ampoule.94 A
problem arises if either ampoule is then removed and reinserted. There is no known way of reinserting the ampoules
in the same positions they were in prior to commencing
the test. Removal and reinsertion would affect subsequent
readings because of variation in refraction. 5 Therefore, the
ampoule cannot be retested in the machine once it has been
removed. The Alaska Supreme Court in Lauderdale asserted
that a retest could be made, and if the readings were lower
the results would be suspect; this is because the reaction
of the alcohol with the chemicals would continue and over
a period of time the expected result would be a higher
reading. 6 In view of the concepts of photometric balance
and refraction this assertion is obviously invalid.
The breathalyzer is not a specific test for alcohol. Other
substances may react or interfere with the chemical reaction
in the ampoule to give a false positive reading. As a practical matter, however, several factors combine to minimize
or eliminate from consideration nearly every case of a false
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL
note 90, at 24.
95. State v. Bryan, 133 N.J. Super. 369, 336 A.2d 511 (1974).
96. Lauderdale v. State, supra note 70, at 379-380.
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reading: (1) breathalyzers are designed solely for analysis
of breath samples, therefore, other substances which could
give a false reading must appear in the breath of living and
conscious persons; (2) the reactions, conditions of time,
temperature, sample volumes, and concentrations further
sharply reduce the number of each volatile substance which
can react with the breathalyzer reagents. For example, the
reaction time of the solution with ethanol is 90 seconds. 7
Within this time, substances such as methyl alcohol, acetone,
etc. will not react; extending the reaction time allows a
variety of such substances to react;98 (3) most of the potential interfering substances have highly characteristic and
readily recognizable odors; (4) in traffic law enforcement
it is unusual to find potential interferents in sufficient
concentrations to significantly affect the breathalyzer reading. Thus, given the conditions under which most tests are
run, the interference problem is of little importance.99
Many states run spot checks on a certain number of
ampoules from every lot purchased to assure the quality of
the ampoules. As long as the breathalyzer has been properly
maintained and the operator followed the checklist, some
courts have held that spot checks are sufficient prima facie
proof that the chemicals in any one ampoule are of the
proper kind and mixed in the proper proportions."' This is
due primarily to the fact that the ampoule is a sealed container and must be broken to allow access to the solution.
Once opened, an ampoule cannot be resealed.
As discussed above, the only critical factor regarding
the breathalyzer is the volume of the solution. This can be
discovered by cross-examination of the operator. Thus, physical examination of the ampoules would not yield any
material information that could not be gained through
cross-examination.
97.

SMITH & WESSON, supra note 86, at 1.

98. id.

99.

COMMITTEE ON MEDICOLEGAL PROBLEMS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER, A MANUAL ON THE MEDICOLEGAL
ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION 103-104 (1973).

100. See e.g. State v. Baker, supra note 5; State v. De Vit,
478, 311 A.2d 753 (1973).
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CONCLUSION

The driver who drinks is on notice that, when arrested
for driving under the influence, he impliedly consents to a
chemical test of his blood alcohol content, the results of
which can be used against him. Wyoming's implied consent
statutes provide that the accused be offered the opportunity
to have that test conducted by a person or entity of his own
choosing."' Another section in that chapter provides that
the Department of Health and Social Services shall set forth
the procedure for testing breath for intoxicattion.1°' That
department has approved the use of a detailed checklist
which is intended to insure that the certified operator tests
the ampoule and conducts the breathalyzer test in an accepted
manner.
The certified operator may be cross-examined as to his
qualifications, the procedures he used, and the operation of
the machine, including the balancing of the photometric
cells, measuring of the ampoule size and volume, and the
color of the solution. Though a rebuttable presumption of
intoxication may arise, the breathalyzer result is not the
only evidence supporting the charge. The arresting officer
may be questioned regarding his belief that he had probable
cause to arrest, as well as the experience upon which he
based that belief.
The law in Wyoming contains no direction, express or
implied, that the ampoules should be preserved.' As chemical testing units, the ampoules are more analogous to the
chemicals used in the analysis of blood and urine than to
physical evidence. Additionally, it is clear that preservation
101. WYO. STAT. §§ 31-6-102(a), 31-6-105(d) (1977).
102. WYO. STAT. § 31-6-105(a) (1977).
103. A recent opinion of the First Judicial District Court of Wyoming affirmed
appellant's conviction for driving under the influence. One of the issues on
appeal was the admission in evidence of the breathalyzer test, which
appellant argued should have been suppressed because of the state's failure
to produce the ampoule used in the test. The district court held that (1)
appellant had failed to demonstrate that the ampoule was either favorable
or material under Brady; (2) appellant had failed to produce any scientific evidence at trial that retesting of the ampoule was scientifically
possible; and (3) appellant was afforded due process safeguards under
Wyoming Implied Consent Law which allowed an independent test to
impeach the breathalyzer. A copy of this opinion is on file with the LAND
AND WATER LAW REVEW and may be obtained by requesting State v.
McHenry, Docket 15, No. 90, October 1. 1979.
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of the breathalyzer ampoules is limited by some practical
considerations. The ampoule contains sulphuric acid, which
is extremely hazardous. Once the ampoule has been opened,
it cannot be resealed, and preserving an open container of
sulphuric acid can be dangerous. Even assuming that one
would wish to take the risks inherent in preserving open
vials of acid, there is no reliable, accurate means of retesting
the ampoules. Viewed in this light, preservation of the
ampoules becomes a hazardous exercise in futility.
If the Hitch rationale of theoretical materiality is
accepted without limitation, its logical extension eventually
would be the requirement that anything and everything
having to do with the test be preserved and disclosed to the
defendant. Ultimately, this could mean that the entire
machine would have to be preserved, intact, just as it was
immediately after the test. The ramifications in terms of
cost and clutter are obvious. There would be an effective
negation of the very statutes created to protect the public
from the person who chooses to drink and drive.
The line must be drawn somewhere. Due process requires only that the defendant be afforded a fair trial. It
does not require that the state hurdle every obstacle to grant
the defendant's wishes. The better rule of reason is to draw
the line short of the requirement of preservation of the
ampoules used in the breathalyzer test.
MARVIN JAMES JOHNSON
BILLIE RUTH EDWARDS
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